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Example.
(D,D,D,D) – NE, (A,A,A,A) – NOT NE
Characteristic Function of the game Γ1 (C.f. of Γ1)
v1(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v1(1, 2, 3) = 5, v1(1, 3, 4) = 5, v1(2, 3, 4) = 0, v1(1, 2, 4) = 5,
v1(1, 2) = 5, v1(1, 3) = 5, v1(1, 4) = 5, v1(2, 3) = 0, v1(2, 4) = 0, v1(3, 4) = 0,
v1(1) = 5, v1(2) = 0, v1(3) = 0, v1(4) = 0.
Sh1 =
(
27
4
, 7
4
, 7
4
, 7
4
)
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C.f. of Γ2
v2(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v2(1, 2, 3) = 5, v2(1, 3, 4) = 5, v2(2, 3, 4) = 9,
v2(1, 2) = 5, v2(1, 3) = 0, v2(1, 4) = 0, v2(2, 3) = 5, v2(2, 4) = 5, v2(3, 4) = 0,
v2(1) = 0, v2(2) = 5, v2(3) = 0, v2(4) = 0.
Sh2 =
(
19
12
, 65
12
, 30
12
, 30
12
)
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C.f. of Γ3
v3(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v3(1, 2, 3) = 5, v3(1, 3, 4) = 9, v3(2, 3, 4) = 9, v3(1, 2, 4) = 0
v3(1, 2) = 0, v3(1, 3) = 5, v3(1, 4) = 0, v3(2, 3) = 5, v3(2, 4) = 0, v3(3, 4) = 6,
v3(1) = 0, v3(2) = 0, v3(3) = 5, v3(4) = 0.
Sh3 =
(
1, 1, 90
12
, 30
12
)
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C.f. of Γ4
v4(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v4(1, 2, 3) = 0, v4(1, 3, 4) = 9, v4(2, 3, 4) = 9, v4(1, 2, 4) = 9
v4(1, 2) = 0, v4(1, 3) = 0, v4(1, 4) = 5, v4(2, 3) = 0, v4(2, 4) = 5, v4(3, 4) = 5,
v4(1) = 0, v4(2) = 0, v4(3) = 0, v4(4) = 5.
Sh4 =
(
17
12
, 17
12
, 17
12
, 93
12
)
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C.f. of Γ5
v5(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v5(1, 2, 3) = v5(1, 3, 4) = v5(2, 3, 4) = v5(1, 2, 4) = 9
v5(1, 2) = v5(1, 3) = v5(1, 4) = v5(2, 3) = v5(2, 4) = v5(3, 4) = 6,
v5(1) = v5(2) = v5(3) = v5(4) = 3.
Sh5 = (3, 3, 3, 3)
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IDP (Imputation Distribution Procedure)
βk , k = 1, . . . , 5
Sh1 = β1 + Sh
2, Sh2 = β2 + Sh
3, . . . , Sh4 = β4 + Sh
5
β1 = (Sh
1−Sh2), β2 = (Sh2−Sh3), β3 = (Sh3−Sh4), β4 = (Sh4−Sh5), β5 = Sh5
∑5
k=1 βk = Sh
1,
∑5
k=2 βk = Sh
2,
∑5
k=3 βk = Sh
3,∑5
k=4 βk = Sh
4,
∑5
k=5 βk = Sh
5
β1 = (
62
12
,− 44
12
,− 9
12
,− 9
12
)
β2 = (
7
12
, 53
12
,− 60
12
, 0)
β3 = (− 512 ,− 512 , 7312 ,− 6312 )
β4 = (− 1912 ,− 1912 ,− 1912 , 5712 )
β5 = (3, 3, 3, 3)
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Associated Game Γ, and NE Strategically Supported Cooperation
(A,A,A,A) – NE
NE

62
12
+ 7
12
− 5
12
− 19
12
+ 3 > 5
53
12
− 5
12
− 19
12
+ 3 > 5
73
12
− 19
12
+ 3 > 5
57
12
+ 3 > 5
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1. Classical control problem.
x˙ = f (x , u), x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U ⊂ CompR l ,
x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0,T ],
H(x(T )) = −ρ(x(T ),M).
C(x0,T − t0) – reachability set.
x¯(t) – optimal trajectory.
Γ(x0,T − t0), Γ(x¯(t),T − t), C(x¯(t),T − t)
R. Bellmann
Time-consistency, Strong Time-consistency.
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2. Multycriterial control.
x˙ = f (x , u), x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U ⊂ CompR l ,
x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0,T ],
H(x(T )) = {H1(x(T )), . . . ,Hk(x(T ))}.
Let k = 3, Hi (x(T )) = −ρ(x(T ),Mi ).
Pareto-optimal solution.
x¯(t) – Pareto-optimal trajectory.
Γ(x0,T − t0), Γ(x¯(t),T − t), C(x0,T − t0), C(x¯(t),T − t),
P(x0,T − t0),P(x¯(t),T − t)
TC but not STC
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3. Nash bargaining solution in Differential Games.
x˙ = f (x , u1, . . . , un), x ∈ Rm, ui ∈ Ui ⊂ CompR l ,
x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0,T ],
The payoff of player i → Hi (x(T )),
Γ(x0,T − t0)
W (x0,T − t0; {i}) – the garanteed payoff of player i
NB.
max
x′∈C(x0,T−t0)
n∏
i=1
(Hi (x
′)−W (x0,T − t0; {i})) =
n∏
i=1
(Hi (x¯)−W (x0,T − t0; {i}))
x¯(t), x0 → x¯ , Γ(x¯(t),T − t), t ∈ [t0,T − t0], W (x¯(t),T − t; {i})
max
x′∈C(x¯(t),T−t)
n∏
i=1
(Hi (x
′)−W (x¯(t),T−t; {i})) =
n∏
i=1
(Hi (x¯(x¯(t)))−W (x¯(t),T−t; {i}))
x¯(x¯(t)) 6= const 6= x¯
NB, not TC, not STC
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4. Differential Cooperative Game.
Differential Cooperative Game Γ(x0,T−t0) with prescribed duration T−t0 from
the initial position x0.
x˙ = f (x , u1, . . . , un), x ∈ Rn, ui ∈ Ui (1)
integral payoff
Ki (x0,T − t0; u1, . . . , un) =
∫ T
t0
hi (x(t))dt, hi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Cooperative form of Γ(x0,T − t0).
Cooperative behavior u∗(t) = {u∗1 (t), . . . , u∗n (t)}
n∑
i=1
Ki (x0,T − t0; u∗1 , . . . , u∗n ) =
= max
u1,...,un
n∑
i=1
Ki (x0,T − t0; u1, . . . , un) =
=
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t0
hi (x
∗(t))dt = v(N; x0,T − t0),
x∗(t) – cooperative trajectory.
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Characteristic Function in Γ(x0,T − t0).
v(S ; x0,T − t0), S ⊂ N,
superadditivity: v(S1 ∪ S2; x0,T − t0) ≥ v(S1; x0,T − t0) + v(S2; x0,T − t0),
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
There are different ways on how to define c. f.
a. Classical: v(S ; x0,T − t0) = ValΓS,N\S(x0,T − t0), where
ΓS,N\S(x0,T − t0) is a zero-sum game played upon the
structure of game Γ(x0,T − t0) between S as player 1 and
N \ S as player 2.
b. v(S ; x0,T − t0) = ∑i∈S Ki (x0,T − t0; u¯S , u¯N\S), where
(u¯S , u¯N\S) is some giver NE in Γ′S,N\S played as non zero-sum
game over the structure of Γ(x0,T − t0) between two players:
coalition S as player 1 and N \ S as player 2
c. v(S ; x0,T − t0) = maxuS={ui ,i∈S}
∑
i∈S Ki (x0,T − t0; u¯||uS),
where u¯ = (u¯1, . . . , u¯n) is some fixed NE in Γ(x0,T − t0).
L. Petrosjan, G. Zaccour Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of
pollution cost reduction // Journal of Economics Dunamics & Control,
27 (2003), pp. 381–398.
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Let E(x0,T − t0) be the imputation set in Γ(x0,T − t0):
E(x0,T−t0) = {ξ = (ξi ) :
n∑
i=1
ξi = v(N; x0,T−t0), ξi ≥ v({i}; x0,T−t0), i ∈ N}.
Denote by C t−t0 (x0), t ∈ [t0,T ] reachable set of the (2).
For each y ∈ C t−t0 (x0) consider a subgame Γ(y ,T−t) of the game Γ(x0,T−t0),
with corresponding c. f. v(S ; y ,T − t) and set of imputations E(y ,T − t).
Definition. A point-to-set mapping C(y ,T − t) ⊂ E(y ,T − t) defined for all
y ∈ C t−t0 (x0), t ∈ [t0,T ] is call solution concept (SC) in the family of subgames
Γ(y ,T − t).
In special cases C(y ,T−t) may be a core, NM-solution, Shapley value, nucleous
etc.
What happens when the game develops along the cooperative trajectory x∗(t)?
We pass through current subgame Γ(x∗(t),T − t), wilingly or not updating the
current SC ↔ C(x∗(t),T − t).
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Imputation Distribution Procedure (IDP).
Let ξ¯ ∈ C(x0,T − t0) and βi (t), i ∈ N, t ∈ [t0,T ] satisfies the condition
ξ¯ =
∫ T
t0
βi (t)dt, i ∈ N, βi ≥ 0.
βi (t) is called IDP.
Define
ξ¯(θ) =
∫ θ
t0
βi (t)dt, i ∈ N, βi ≥ 0.
Definition. The SC C(x∗(t),T − t), t ∈ [t0,T ] is called time-consistent (TC) if
there exist such IDP β(t) = {βi (t)} that
ξ¯ − ξ¯(θ) ∈ C(x∗(θ),T − θ)
for all θ ∈ [t0,T ].
Definition. The SC C(x∗(t),T − t), t ∈ [t0,T ] is called strongly time-consistent
(STC) if there exist such IDP β(t) = {βi (t)} that
ξ¯(θ)⊕ C¯(x∗(θ),T − θ) ⊂ C(x0,T − t0)
for all θ ∈ [t0,T ]. Here ξ¯ ⊕ A means the set of all possible vectors ξ¯ + η for all
η ∈ A.
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Consider C(x∗(t),T − t) along x∗(t), t ∈ [t0,T ]. Suppose we can construct a
differentiable selector ξt ∈ C(x∗(t),T − t), then we can easily get for β(t) the
following formula
ξ¯ = ξ¯(θ) + ξt → ξ¯ =
∫ θ
t0
βi (t)dt + ξ
t
βi (t) = − d
dt
ξt
If ξt can be chosen as monotonic nonincreasing (which is very possible since
hi > 0, then βi ≥ 0, and SC is TC.
If the case (for instance) C(y ,T − t) is a Shapley value, we get
βi (t) = −
∑
S⊂N,S3i
(n − s)!(s − 1)!
n!
[
d
dt
v(x∗(t),T − t; S)−
− d
dt
v(x∗(t),T − t; S \ {i})
]
and we need only differentiability of the value function (c. f.) v(x ,T − t; S).
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Strategically Supported Cooperation
Continuous time case.
Consider n-person differential game Γ(x0,T − t0) with prescribed duration and
independent motions on the time interval [t0,T ]. Motion equations have the
form:
x˙i = fi (xi , ui ), ui ∈ Ui ⊂ R`, xi ∈ Rn,
xi (t0) = x
0
i , i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
It is assumed that the system of differential equations (2) satisfies all conditions
necessary for the existence, prolongability and uniqueness of the solution for any
n-tuple of measurable controls u1(t), . . . , un(t).
The payoff of player i is defined as:
Hi (x0,T − t0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
∫ T
t0
hi (x(τ))dτ,
where hi (x) is a continuous function and x(τ) = {x1(τ), . . . , xn(τ)} is the so-
lution of (2) when open-loop controls u1(t), . . . , un(t) are used and x(t0) =
{x1(t0), . . . , xn(t0)} = {x01 , . . . , x0n}.
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Suppose that there exist an n-tuple of open-loop controls u¯(t) = (u¯1(t), . . . , u¯n(t))
and the trajectory x¯(t), t ∈ [t0,T ], such that
max
u1(t),...,un(t)
n∑
i=1
Hi (x0,T − t0; u1(t), . . . , un(t)) =
=
n∑
i=1
Hi (x0,T − t0; u¯1(t), . . . , u¯n(t)) =
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t0
hi (x¯i (τ))dτ.(3)
The trajectory x¯(t) = (x¯1(t), . . . , x¯n(t)) satisfying (3) we shall call "optimal
cooperative trajectory".
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. Define in Γ(x0,T − t0) characteristic
function in a classical way:
V (x0,T − t0;N) =
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t0
hi (x¯i (τ))dτ,
V (x0,T − t0; ∅) = 0,
V (x0,T − t0;S) = Val ΓS,N\S(x0,T − t0), (4)
where Val ΓS,N\S(x0,T−t0) is a value of zero-sum game played between coalition
S acting as first player and coalition N \S acting as player 2, with payoff of player
S equal to: ∑
i∈S
Hi (x0,T − t0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)).
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Define L(x0,T − t0) as imputation set in the game Γ(x0,T − t0) (see Neumann
and Morgenstern (1947)):
L(x0,T − t0) = {α = (α1, . . . , αn) :
αi > V (x0,T − t0; {i}),
∑
i∈N
αi = V (x0,T − t0;N)
}
. (5)
Regularized game Γα(x0,T − t0). For every α ∈ L(x0,T − t0) define the nonco-
operative game Γα(x0,T − t0), which differs from the game Γ(x0,T − t0) only
by payoffs defined along optimal cooperative trajectory x¯(τ), τ ∈ [t0,T ].
Let α ∈ L(x0,T − t0). Define the imputation distribution procedure (IDP) (see
Petrosjan (1993)) as function β(τ) = (β1(τ), . . . , βn(τ)), τ ∈ [t0,T ] such that
αi =
∫ T
t0
βi (τ)dτ. (6)
Denote by Hαi (x0,T−t0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) the payoff function in the game Γα(x0,T−
t0) and by x(τ) the corresponding trajectory, then
Hαi (x0,T − t0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) = Hi (x0,T − t0; u1(·), . . . , un(·))
if there does not exist such t ∈ [t0,T ] that x(τ) = x¯(τ) for τ ∈ (t0, t].
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Let t = sup{t′ : x(τ) = x¯(τ), τ ∈ [t0, t′]} and t > t0, then
Hαi (x0,T − t0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
=
∫ t
t0
βi (τ)dτ + Hi (x¯(t),T − t; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
=
∫ t
t0
βi (τ)dτ +
∫ T
t
hi (x(τ))dτ.
In a special case, when x(τ) = x¯(τ), τ ∈ [t0,T ] (if x(τ) is an optimal cooperative
trajectory in the sense of Eq. (3)), we have
Hαi (x0,T − t0; u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) =
∫ T
t0
βi (τ)dτ = αi .
By the definition of payoff function in the game Γα(x0,T − t0)we get that the
payoffs along the optimal trajectory are equal to the components of the imputa-
tion α = (α1, . . . , αn).
Consider the current subgames (see Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)) — Γ(x¯(t),T−
t) along x¯(t) and current imputation sets L(x¯(t),T − t). Let α(t) ∈ L(x¯(t),T −
t). Suppose that α(t) can be selected as differentiable function of t, t ∈ [t0,T ].
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Definition 1. The game Γα(x0,T − t0) is called regularization of the game
Γ(x0,T − t0) (α-regularization) if the IDP β is defined in such a way that
αi (t) =
∫ T
t
βi (τ)dτ
or
βi (t) = −α′i (t). (7)
Theorem 1. In the regularization of the game Γα(x0,T−t0) for every ε > 0 there
exist an ε-Nash equilibrium (Nash (1951)) with payoffs α = (α1, . . . , αi , . . . , αn).
Proof. The proof is based on actual constraction of the ε-Nash equilibrium in
piecewise open-loop (POL) strategies with memory.
Remind the definition of POL strategies with memory in differential game. Denote
by xˆ(t) any admissible trajectory of the system (2) on the time interval [t0, t],
t ∈ [t0,T ].
The strategy ui (·) of player i is called POL if it consists from the pair (a, σ),
where σ is a partition of time interval [t0,T ], t0 < t1 < . . . < tl = T (tk+1−tk =
δ > 0), and a mapping a which corresponds to each point (xˆ(tk), tk), tk ∈ σ an
open-loop control ui (t), t ∈ [tk , tk+1).
Leon A. Petrosyan 21/37
Consider a family of associated with Γ(x ,T − t), but not with Γα(x ,T − t) zero-
sum games Γ{i},N\{i}(x ,T − t) from the initial position x and duration T − t
between the coalition S consisting from a single player i and the coalition N \{i}
with player’s i payoff equal to
Hi (x ,T − t; u1(·) . . . , un(·)).
The payoff of player N \{i} in Γ{i},N\{i}(x ,T − t) equals to (−Hi ). Let uˆ(x , t; ·)
be the ε-optimal POL strategy of player N \ {i} in Γ{i},N\{i}(x ,T − t). Note,
that uˆ(x , t; ·) = {uˆj(x , t; ·)}, j ∈ N \ {i}.
Let xˆ(t) = {xˆ1(t), . . . , xˆn(t)} be the segment of an admissible trajectory of (2)
defined on the time interval [t0, t], t ∈ [t0,T ]. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} define
t¯(i) = sup{ti : xˆi (ti ) = ˆ¯xi (ti )} and t¯(j) = mini t¯(i) = t¯(j). t¯(j) lies in one
of the intervals [tk , tk+1), k = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1. Thus, t¯(i) − t0 is the length of
the time interval starting from t0 on which xi (t) coincides with x¯i (t) — the i-th
component of the cooperative trajectory x¯(t). And t¯(j)− t0 is the length of the
time interval starting from t0 on which x(t) coincides with cooperative trajectory
x¯(t).
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Define the following strategies of player i ∈ N.
u∗i (·) =

u¯i (t) for (xˆ(tk), tk) on the optimal cooperative
trajectory x¯(t) (xˆ(τ) = x¯(τ), τ ∈ [t0, tk ]);
uˆi (xˆ(tk+1), tk+1; ·) i-th component of the ε/2-optimal POL
strategy of player N \ {j} in the game
Γ{j},N\{j}(x(tk+1),T − tk+1), if tk 6 t¯(j) < tk+1;
arbitrary for all other positions.
Show that u∗(·) = (u∗1 (·), . . . , u∗n (·)) is ε-Nash equilibrium in Γα(x0,T−t0). The
following equality holds
Hi (x0,T − t0; u∗(·)) = Hi (x0,T − t0; u∗1 (·), . . . , u∗n (·)) =
∫ T
t0
βi (t)dt = αi . (8)
Consider the n-tuple (u∗(·)||ui (·)) where player i changes his strategy u∗i (·) on
ui (·).
We have to show that
Hi (x0,T − t0; u∗(·)) > Hi (x0,T − t0; u∗(·)||ui (·))− ε. (9)
for all i ∈ N and all POL ui (·) of player i .
It is easy to see that when the n-tuple u∗(·) is played the game develops along
the optimal trajectory x¯(t). If in (u∗(·)||ui (·)) the trajectory x¯(t) is also realized
then (9) will be equality and thus true.
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Suppose now that in (u∗(·)||ui (·)) the trajectory x(t) different form x¯(t) is real-
ized. Then let
t¯ = inf{t : x¯(t) 6= x(t)}.
and t¯ ∈ [tk−1, tk). Since the motion of players are independent we get x¯m(tk) =
xm(tk) for m ∈ N \ {i} and x¯i (tk) 6= xi (tk) (but x¯j(tk−1) = xj(tk−1) for j ∈
N). Then from the definition of u∗(·) it follows that the players m ∈ N \ {i}
will use their strategies uˆm(xˆ(tk), tk ; ·) which are ε2 -optimal in a zero-sum game
Γ{i},N\{i}(x(tk),T − tk) against the player i which deviates from the optimal
trajectory on a time interval [tk−1, tk).
If the players from the set N \ {i} will use their strategies uˆm(xˆ(tk), tk ; ·), player
i starting from position x(tk), tk will get not more than
V (x(tk),T − tk ; {i}) + ε
2
,
where V (x(tk),T − tk ; {i}) is the value of the game Γ{i},N\{i}(x(tk),T − tk).
Then the total payoff of player i in Γα(x0,T − t0) when the n-tuple of strategies
(u∗(·)||ui (·)) is played cannot exceed the amount∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ + V (x(tk), tk ; {i}) + ε
2
+
∫ tk
tk−1
hi (xi (τ))dτ. (10)
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But the payoff of player i when the n-tuple u∗(·) is played is equal to
αi =
∫ T
t0
βi (τ)dτ =
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ+
∫ T
tk−1
βi (τ)dτ =
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ+αi (tk−1).
(11)
By the definition of IDP (see (6), (7)), αi (tk−1) ∈ L(x¯(tk−1),T − tk−1),∫ T
tk−1
βi (τ)dτ = αi (tk−1) > V (x¯(tk−1),T − tk−1; {i}). (12)
From the continuity of the function V and continuity of the trajectory x(t) by
appropriate choice of δ > 0 (tk+1 − tk = δ) the following inequalities can be
guaranteed:
|V (x¯(tk−1),T − tk−1; {i})− V (x(tk),T − tk ; {i})| < ε
4
,∫ T
tk−1
βi (τ)dτ = αi (tk−1) > V (x(tk),T − tk ; {i})− ε
4
.
Compare αi (tk−1) and V (x(tk), tk ; {i}) + ε2 +
∫ tk
tk−1
hi (xi (τ))dτ . By choosing
δ = tk+1−tk sufficiently small one can achieve that the integral
∫ tk
tk−1
hi (xi (τ))dτ
will be also small (less than ε/4).
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Adding to both sides of (12) the amount
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ and using the previous
inequality we get
αi =
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ + αi (tk−1) >
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ + V (x¯(tk−1),T − tk−1; {i}) >
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ + V (x(tk),T − tk ; {i})− ε
4
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ + V (x(tk),T − tk ; {i})− ε
4
+
∫ tk
tk−1
hi (τ)dτ − ε
4
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ + V (x(tk),T − tk ; {i}) +
∫ tk
tk−1
hi (τ)dτ − ε
2
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ + V (x(tk),T − tk ; {i}) +
∫ tk
tk−1
hi (τ)dτ +
+
ε
2
− ε
2
− ε
2
. (13)
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Here first four addends in the right part of the inequality constitute the upper
bound of player i payoff when (u∗(·)||u∗i (·)) is played. But αi is the payoff of
player i when u∗(·) is played, and we get
Hi (x0,T − t0; u∗(·)) = αi >
>
∫ tk−1
t0
βi (τ)dτ + V (x(tk),T − tk ; {i}) +
∫ tk
tk−1
hi (τ)dτ +
ε
2
− ε >
> Hi (x0,T − t0; u∗(·)||ui (·))− ε (14)
and we get (9). The theorem is proved. 
This means that the cooperative solution (any imputation) can be strategically
supported in a regularized game Γα(x0,T−t0) (realized in a specially constructed
Nash equilibrium) by the Nash equilibrium u∗(·) defined in the Theorem 1.
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Discrete time case.
In what follows as basic model we shall consider the game in extensive form with
perfect information.
Definition 2. A game tree is a finite oriented treelike graph K with the root x0.
We shall use the following notations. Let x be some vertex (position). We denote
by K(x) a subtree K with the root in x . We denote by Z(x) immediate successors
of x . The vertices y , directly following after x , are called alternatives in x (y ∈
Z(x)). The player who makes a decision in x (who selects the next alternative
position in x), will be denoted by i(x). The choice of player i(x) in position x
will be denoted by x¯ ∈ Z(x).
Let N = {1, . . . , n} — be the set of all players in the game.
Definition 3. A game in extensive form with perfect information (see Kuhn
(1953)) G(x0) is a graph tree K(x0), with the following additional properties:
The set of vertices (positions) is split up into n + 1 subsets
P1,P2, . . . ,Pn+1, which form a partition of the set of all vertices of the
graph tree K . The vertices (positions) x ∈ Pi are called players i personal
positions, i = 1, . . . , n; vertices (positions) x ∈ Pn+1 are called terminal
positions.
In each final vertex (position) the system of real numbers
h(w) = (h1(w), . . . , hn(w)), w ∈ Pn+1, hi (w) > 0, i = 1, . . . , n is defined.
Where hi (w) is the payoff of player i in the final vertex (position).
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Definition 4. A strategy of player i is a mapping Ui (·), which associate to each
position x ∈ Pi a unique alternative y ∈ Z(x).
As in the previous case denote by Hi (x ; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) the payoff function od
player i ∈ N in the subgame G(x) starting from the position x .
Hi (x ; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) = hi (x ′l )
where x ′l ∈ Pn+1 is the last vertex (position) in the path x = (x ′1, x ′2, . . . , x ′l )
realized in the subgame G(x), when the n-tuple of strategies (u1(·), . . . , un(·))
is played.
Denote by u¯(·) = (u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) the n-tuple of strategies and the trajectory
(path) x¯ = (x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯m), x¯m ∈ Pn+1 such that
max
u1(·),...,un(·)
n∑
i=1
Hi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
=
n∑
i=1
Hi (x0; u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) =
n∑
i=1
hi (x¯m). (15)
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The path x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯m) satisfying Eq. (15) we shall call "optimal cooperative
trajectory".
Define in G(x0) characteristic function in a classical way
V (x0;N) =
n∑
i=1
hi (x¯m),
V (x0; ∅) = 0,
V (x0;S) = Val ΓS,N\S(x0),
where Val ΓS,N\S(x0) is a value of zero-sum game played between coalition S
acting as first player and coalition N \ S acting as player 2, with payoff of player
S equal to ∑
i∈S
Hi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)).
Define L(x0) as imputation set in the game G(x0).
L(x0) =
{
α = (α1, . . . , αn) : αi > V (x0; {i}),
∑
i∈N
αi = V (x0;N)
}
.
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Regularized game Gα(x0). For every α ∈ L(x0) define the noncooperative game
Gα(x0), which differs from the game G(x0) only by payoffs defined along optimal
cooperative path x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯m). Let α ∈ L(x0). Define the imputation dis-
tribution procedure (IDP) as function βk = (β1(k), . . . , βn(k)), k = 0, 1, . . . ,m
such that
αi =
m∑
k=0
βi (k). (16)
Define by Hαi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) the payoff function in the game Gα(x0) and by
x¯ = {x¯0, . . . , x¯m} the cooperative path
Hαi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) = Hi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·))
for all u1(·), . . . , un(·) such that the path x = {x0, . . . , xm} differs from x¯ =
{x¯0, . . . , x¯m}, and
Hαi (x0; u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) = αi .
By the definition of the payoff function in the game Gα(x0) we get that the
payoffs along the optimal cooperative trajectory are equal to the components of
the imputation α = (α1, . . . , αn).
Leon A. Petrosyan 31/37
Consider current subgames G(x¯k) along the optimal path x¯ and current imputa-
tion sets L(x¯k). Let αk ∈ L(x¯k).
Definition 5. The game Gα(x0) is called regularization of the game G(x0) (α-
regularization) if the IDP β is defined in such a way that
αki =
m∑
j=k
βi (j)
or βi (k) = αki − αk+1i , i ∈ N, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1, βi (m) = αmi , α0i = αi .
Theorem 2. In the regularization of the game Gα(x0) there exist a Nash equilib-
rium with payoffs α = (α1, . . . , αn).
Proof. Along the cooperative path we have
αki > V (x¯k ; {i}), i ∈ N, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m.
since αk = (αk1 , . . . , αkn) ∈ L(x¯k) is an imputation in G(x¯k) (note that here
V (x¯k ; {i}) is computed in the subgame G(x¯k) but not Gα(x¯k)). In the same time
αki =
m∑
j=k
βi (j)
and we get
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m∑
j=k
βi (j) > V (x¯k ; {i}), i ∈ N, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m. (17)
But
∑m
j=k βi (j) is the payoff of player i in the subgame Gα(x¯k) along the coop-
erative path, and from (17) using the arguments similar to those in the proof of
Theorem 1 one can construct the Nash equilibrium with payoffs α = (α1, . . . , αn)
and resulting cooperative path x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯m).
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Example. In this example as an imputation we shall consider Shapley value [Shap-
ley (1953)]. Using the proposed regularization of the game we shall see that there
exist a Nash equilibrium with payoffs equal to the components of the Shapley
value.
Fig. 1. Game G(x0)
In the game G(x0), N = {1, 2, 3}, P1 = {x1, x4, x7}, P2 = {x2, x5, x8}, P3 =
{x3, x6, x9}, P4 = {y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7, y8, y9, y10}. h(y1) = (0, 5, 2), h(y2) =
(6, 1, 0), h(y3) = (1, 5, 0), h(y4) = (0, 2, 7), h(y5) = (0, 9, 0), h(y6) = (4, 1, 2),
h(y7) = (2, 3, 2), h(y8) = (0, 9, 0), h(y9) = (0, 3, 4), h(y10) = (1, 8, 1). The
cooperative path is x¯ = {x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, x¯4, x¯5, x¯6, x¯7, x¯8, x¯9, y¯10}.
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 y10
V (x ; {1}) 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1
V (x ; {2}) 2 2 2 2 9 1 3 9 3 8
V (x ; {3}) 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 1
V (x ; {1, 2}) 7 7 6 9 9 5 9 9 3 9
V (x ; {2, 3}) 7 9 9 9 9 5 5 9 9 9
V (x ; {1, 3}) 6 6 6 7 0 6 4 0 4 2
V (x ; {1, 2, 3}) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Sh(x ; {1}) 17
6
13
6
12
6
16
6
2
6
22
6
24
6
2
6
2
6
1
Sh(x ; {2}) 26
6
28
6
27
6
28
6
56
6
16
6
30
6
56
6
26
6
8
Sh(x ; {3}) 17
6
19
6
21
6
16
6
2
6
22
6
6
6
2
6
32
6
1
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 y10
β1(j)
2
6
4
6
1
6
14
6
−28
6
−2
6
22
6
0 −4
6
1
β2(j) −1
6
−2
6
1
6
−28
6
40
6
−14
6
−28
6
30
6
−22
6
8
β3(j) −1
6
−2
6
−2
6
14
6
−20
6
16
6
4
6
−30
6
26
6
1
It can be easily seen that the inequality (17)
m∑
j=k
βi (j) > V (x¯k ; {i})
for i ∈ N holds in this case.
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